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King: The Soul of the Virtual Machine: In re Alappat

THE SOUL OF THE VIRTUAL MACHINE:
IN RE ALAPPAT
I. INTRODUCTION

I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws
and constitutions. But laws and institutions must go
hand and hand with the progress of the human
mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths
discovered and manners and opinions change, with
the change of circumstances, institutions must
advance also to keep pace with the times.
Thomas Jefferson'
The Patent Clause of the United States Constitution2 has
witnessed profound changes in our society and in the "useful arts"
that society has relied upon for improvements in the quality of life.
The Patent Clause, although born in an 18th century world with an
economy based largely on agriculture, contained enough flexibility
to accommodate the mechanization of production that characterized
the Industrial Revolution. As modern computer technology of the
late 20th century bends our conception of "the useful arts," the
Patent Clause must now accommodate the next wave of economic
development: the Information Age.
Instant access to virtually limitless raw information is at the
heart of today's service economy.3 Economic value resides increasingly in the creation, distribution, interpretation and transforma-

1 Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure: A PreliminaryDraft of the Report of the Working Group on
IntellectualPropertyRights 9 (July 1994) [hereinafter Green Paper](quoting from inscription
on Jefferson Memorial in Washington, D.C. and noting that Thomas Jefferson was effectively
nation's first Patent Commissioner as Secretary of State).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states: "The Congress shall have Power To... promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
3 See ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1980) (predicting gradual development of
Information Age to supplant Industrial Age of last two centuries).
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tion of information. This information may take many forms,
including text, sound, images, and video. Representation of
information by ones and zeros, the binary language of the computer, permits the development of standardized formats for storage,
distribution, manipulation, and display. This standardization
lowers costs so that the ideal of universal access to information by
all members of society is within reach, spawning the digitallydriven Information Age.
One of the key tools of the Information Age is computer applications software used to manipulate information and perform other
useful tasks. Applications software can take a number of forms,
including computer operating instructions residing permanently in
the read-only memory (ROM) of a personal computer, applicationsspecific integrated circuitry (ASIC) installed in special-purpose test
equipment, or the familiar word processor program loaded temporarily into the random-access memory (RAM) of a personal
computer.
Applications software tools do not fit comfortably into our more
familiar paradigms of work, tools, and "useful arts." We can
neither pick them up nor see them, and their propensity to take
many forms gives them a disturbingly ephemeral quality. But tools
they are, no less so than the cotton gin, the telegraph, or the
intermittent windshield wiper.
Courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have
had a difficult and confusing time dealing with patents for
computer software, in spite of, or perhaps because of, a doctrinal
formalism purporting to provide clear rules.4 While the Patent Act

" During consideration of software patent applications in the PTO, the mathematical
algorithms or quantitative operations underlying the software are scrutinized to ensure that
a patent is not granted for laws of nature, natural phenomena or abstract ideas in
mathematical form. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981). For
example, the mathematical formula relating the circumference of a circle to its diameter (C=n
x d) clearly represents unpatentable subject matter. The so-called Freeman-Waltertwo-part
test for such algorithms was first enunciated in In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978) and later modified in In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 205 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 397 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The test is as follows:
First, the claim is analyzed to determine whether a mathematical
algorithm is directly or indirectly recited. Next, if a mathematical
algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to determine
whether the algorithm is "applied in any manner to physical elements or
process steps," and, if it is, it "passes muster under § 101."
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uses broad language to describe what sorts of inventions are
patentable,' courts have excluded abstract ideas, natural phenomena and laws of nature from patentability.6 Some commentators
have argued that the nature of computer software is such that
neither patent law nor copyright law provides appropriate protection, and that special software protection legislation should be
adopted instead.7 The software development community, the
patent bar, and the PTO have been without clear judicial guidance
on this question of software patentability. This Note will examine
In re Alappat, a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (CAFC), sitting en banc, which clears away

some of the doctrinal haze obscuring the statutory requirements for
the patentability of applications software.

II. BACKGROUND
In In re Alappat, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
determined that a mathematical algorithm used to enhance
electrical signals and thereby improve their display on a digital
storage oscilloscope constituted patentable subject matter, even
though that algorithm could easily be implemented via computer
software.9 The decision was significant because the court expressly

In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting In re
Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
' "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
0 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-88, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981); Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589-91, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1978).
'E.g., Pamela Samuelson et al.,A Manifesto Concerningthe Legal Protectionof Computer
Programs,94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308 (1994) (hereinafter Manifesto] (arguing for sui generis
protection and providing range of possible forms for such protection); Pamela Samuelson,
Benson Revisited: The Case Against PatentProtectionfor Algorithms and Other ComputerRelated Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990) (arguing that special sui generis protection
of software is needed rather than patent protection); Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New
Kind ofIntellectualProperty: Analyzing the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs,
70 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985) (proposing sui generis protection).
8
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
9 Id. at 1545.
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recognized ° that computer applications software by itself is
within the subject matter realm of 35 U.S.C. § 101.11 The decision
requires that the PTO
revise its treatment of the patentability of
12
computer software.
Kuriappan P. Alappat and his fellow engineers 13 claimed to
have invented a solution to a problem endemic to the digital
storage oscilloscope, an electronic test instrument used by engi14
neers and technicians to measure and display electrical signals.
Without the use of Alappat's invention, the signal waveforms
displayed on a digital oscilloscope screen often exhibit jagged edges,
known as aliasing, when the oscilloscope is measuring and
displaying signals with rapid rise or fall times. This aliasing is a
result of the limited resolution of the oscilloscope's digital sampling
scheme. Alappat developed a technique to smooth out these jagged
edges by illuminating display pixels (spots of light on the display
screen) near the waveform being displayed with intensities
proportional to the distance from the center of each pixel to the
desired smooth display trace.15 This new "rasterizer"16 used a
mathematical algorithm, or sequence of calculation steps, to
calculate the intensity for the nearby pixels. 7 While Alappat's
claims recited the use of electronic hardware to implement his

10Id. ("[A] computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable subject
matter, provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all of the other
requirements of Title 35.").
1 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
12 See Fred McKelvey, PTO Report on Patentable Subject Matter: Mathematical
Algorithmsand ComputerPrograms,reprintedin 38 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
563 (Sept. 21, 1989) (setting forth PTO's reliance on Freeman-Walter-Abele two-part test).
" Alappat, Edward E. Averill, and James G. Larsen were employees of Tektronix, Inc.
of Wilsonville, Oregon, a manufacturer of electronic test equipment and computer-related
equipment. Their patent application was designated in the PTO as application Serial No.
07/149,792. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
14 Id. at 1537.
15Id. at 1537-38.
16 Id. A raster is a particular array of pixels in a digital oscilloscope display, which
consists of pixels arranged in rows and columns. A time-varying electrical signal is
represented on a simple digital oscilloscope by turning on one pixel in each column. Each
successive column represents an incremental increase in time, and each row represents
measured signal magnitude. A "rasterizer" effects a transformation of this simple measured
signal map into a new, more complex map. Id. at 1537.
17 Id. at 1538.
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algorithm,' 8 it could have easily been implemented in computer
software or firmware. 9
Alappat's claims 20 incorporating the rasterizer algorithm were
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 by the PTO Examiner as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter. 2' Alappat appealed to
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the Board),2 2 and
a three-member panel reversed the Examiner's claims rejection.23
The Examiner requested reconsideration of that decision, and an
expanded eight-member Board affirmed the Examiner's original
rejection on the prior subject matter grounds. 24
Alappat appealed the expanded Board's rejection to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). Before reaching the merits
of the dispute, the en banc CAFC raised sua sponte25 a question
of the validity of the Patent Commissioner's empaneling of an
expanded Board to reconsider the three-member panel's decision.
The CAFC concluded that the expanded Board's decision was
proper and that the court therefore had jurisdiction to consider the

"' In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
'9 Id. at 1527.
'o Claim 15 of Alappat's patent application read: A rasterizer for converting vector list
data representing sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel
illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means comprising:
(a) means for determining the vertical distance between the endpoints of each of
the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining the elevation of a row of pixels that is spanned by the
vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a predetermined function
of the normalized vertical distance and elevation.
Id. at
1538-39.
1
2 1d. at 1531.
2 See Simson L. Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, 2.07 WIRED, July 1994, at 104 (lamenting
lack of access to prior art within PTO); Elinor Mills, Annulling Compton's Patent Helps PTO
Earn Industry's Trust, INFOWORLD, Nov. 14, 1994, at 38 (observing PTO's recent attempts
to build prior art database); Briefs, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 22, 1994, at 67 (noting addition
of nine computer scientists to PTO staff).
23
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
24 Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (B.P.A.I. 1992). The expanded Board
characterized its reversal as a "modification" of the original three-member Board's decision,
but stated that its decision was a "new decision" for the purposes of reconsideration or court
review. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
26 See Coastal Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that
jurisdiction cannot be conferred on CAFC by implied or express waiver).
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appeal.2 6
On the merits of Alappat's patent application, the court, by a six
to two margin,27 reversed the expanded Board's rejection and held

that the use of a mathematical algorithm in software does not bar
a machine from patentability on Section 101 subject matter
grounds. The court noted, however, that the claimed invention as

a whole must not merely be an abstract mathematical concept, but
must have practical application.28
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS
A. JUDGE RICH'S MAJORITY OPINION

The court was presented with two issues regarding the merits of
the case:
A) whether 35 U.S.C. Section 112 Paragraph 6 requires
that a claim for an algorithm be construed as including the
structure described in the specification portion of the
application; 29 and
B) whether Alappat's algorithm falls within the judiciallycreated "mathematical algorithm" exception to the subject
matter provisions of Section 101.3 °
Judge Rich wrote the court's opinion and was joined by or
explicitly concurred with by five of the other eleven judges, with

26 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1530-36 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The issue of the authority of the
PTO to empanel an expanded Board for reconsideration was significant, and deserving of
substantial comment, but is beyond the scope of this Note. Id. at 1530.
7 Judges Newman, Lourie, Plager and Rader joined on the merits in Judge Rich's
majority opinion. Chief Judge Archer and Judge Nies dissented on the merits, while Judges
Mayer, Clevenger and Schall would hold that the Court lacked jurisdiction and therefor
provided no opinion on the merits. Id. at 1530.
28Id.

at 1544.

Id. at 1540. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) states:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
3o

See infra note 35.
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three of the judges taking no position. 1 The majority quickly
disposed of the § 112 issue, 32 holding that the plain meaning and
prior CAFC interpretation of the statute rendered Alappat's
algorithm to be directed toward a machine made up of a combination of electronic circuits disclosed in the patent application
specification." The majority said that the expanded Board had
"erred as a matter of law in refusing to apply [Sec.] 112, [Para.] 6
"34

After determining that the claim was indeed for a "machine," the
majority addressed the second issue of whether the invention
nonetheless fell within the judicially-created "mathematical
algorithm" exception 35 to the § 101 litany of patentable subject
matter. Significantly, Judge Rich abandoned the two-part Freeman-Walter-Abele test36 developed during the late 1970s and early
1980s for algorithm patentability.
Instead of the formalism of the two-part test, the majority read
Supreme Court precedent to require that, for subject matter
analysis, mathematics-based claims must be considered within the
context of the invention as a whole.3 7 Judge Rich concluded that
"the dispositive inquiry is whether the the claim as a whole is
directed to statutory subject matter," and not "whether a claim

See supra note 27.
Judge Archer's dissent described this issue as a "red herring." In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
33 Id. at 1541. The specification of Alappat's invention provided in the patent application
disclosed a hardware implementation of the rasterizer using several common discrete digital
circuit devices, including shift registers, arithmetic logic units, barrel shifters, counters and
read-only memory (ROM). Id. at 1558-59.
3Id.
at 1540.
3Abstract mathematical algorithms standing alone have been considered by courts to
be unpatentable subject matter because they are considered fundamental properties of
nature not created by mankind. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (holding
unpatentable algorithm to convert binary coded decimal numbers into decimal numbers
without recital of machine structure); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978) (holding
algorithm to update chemical process alarm limits to be unpatentable despite "post-solution"
physical activity); but cf Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981) (finding mathematical algorithm to be patentable when included as part of physical process for curing rubber).
See supra note 4.
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 192 (1981) ("[WIhen a claim containing a mathematical formula in a structure or process
which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were
designed to protect .... then the claim satisfies the requirements of Sec. 101.")).
'
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contains... any mathematical subject matter which standing alone
would not be entitled to patent protection.""
The majority
reasoned that Alappat's invention as a whole was clearly directed
to a machine and accordingly held that the algorithm claim was
patentable.3 9 Moreover, the majority looked to the text of § 101
itself to assert that use of the term "any" in the statute was
evidence of Congress' intent that the statute be interpreted broadly,
and that a plain meaning of the statute supported the same
inference.'
The majority recognized that the Supreme Court had previously
carved out three exceptions for subject matter for which patent
protection is not available: "laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas."' But the majority limited the exceptions
established by prior cases to the rule that mathematics itself is not
patentable until it is practically applied.4 2
In what could be characterized as dicta, the majority expanded
its holding to the broader issue of the patentability of computer
software. Pointing to case law developed by the Federal Circuit's
predecessor court, 43 Judge Rich urged that a computer programmed by software to perform particular functions "creates a
new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes
a special purpose computer once it is programmed ... ."4 Judge
Rich closed with the assertion that "[i]n any case, a computer, like
[Alappat's] rasterizer, is apparatus not mathematics." Although
the preamble to Alappat's patent application described discrete
electronic hardware circuitry for implementing the algorithm, the
majority would hold that the algorithm claims write on a generalpurpose computer as well. 46

' In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
39

Id.

at 1544-45.

Id. at 1542. The court felt that no limitations should be read into 35 U.S.C § 101
unless
the legislative history clearly shows the intention of such limitations. Id.
1
4 Id. at 1542 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
40

4Id.

at 1543.

re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 721 (C.C.PA 1976); In re
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
"In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
43In

"Id.
46Id.
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CHIEF JUDGE ARCHER'S DISSENTING OPINION

Judge Archer disagreed with the majority's application of case
precedent and statutory interpretation, and would have held
Alappat's rasterizer to be an unpatentable mathematical equation.4 7 First, he pointed to historical treatment of the subject
matter inquiry, noting that statutory subject matter has traditionally been found only in new and useful effects or results grounded
in the earth's substances.'
Second, he urged that terms of art
such as "process," "machine" and "invent" in § 101 must be
construed in accordance with judicial precedent and with established meanings,4 9 and that novelty considerations should not
enter into the subject matter calculus.50
The dissent analogized computer software and abstract mathematics to musical creations.5 Chief Judge Archer compared a
song, which may be embodied in a compact disc, record or cassette
tape, to computer software or a mathematical algorithm, which
may be implemented in a number of ways. Continuing the analogy,
Judge Archer held that the mere recital of hardware structure
along with an algorithm claim does not render the claim patentable
any more than the recital of a compact disc player along with music
renders the music itself patentable.5 2
Judge Archer distinguished Supreme Court precedent, arguing
that an algorithm previously held patentable was not claimed
independently of hardware, while Alappat's disputed algorithm
claim stood alone and recited only abstract mathematics.5"
Finally, the dissent attacked the majority's reliance on dated,
overruled precedent in the Federal Circuit's predecessor court.

47 Id. at 1551-52.
4

Id. at 1552 (citing G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL

INVENTIONS xxiii-xxv (4th ed. 1873) (providing excerpt from 1873 patent treatise discussing
transformations in particles of matter and physical forces which are purportedly at heart of
patentable subject matter)).
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (arguing that terms should be read
in patent law context, requiring inventions to have practical application).
50 Id. ('Specific conditions for patentability follow" 35 U.S.C. § 101 (quoting Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981))).
" Id. at 1554.
u Id.
"Id. at 1557 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14 (1981)).
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Judge Archer contended that such precedent has led to a surfeit of
claim structures where drafting artfulness is exalted over claim
substance."
The dissent predicted that the majority's broader holding
regarding the patentability of software for general-purpose
computers would have "untold consequences," 5 warning of stifling
mathematical patents and the "technological exclusivity" they
would engender.'
C. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS

Judge Newman provided a strong, policy-centered concurring
opinion, arguing that patent law has always evolved and must
continue to evolve in parallel with technological change.57 She
looked to mathematics as merely one of many basic tools of
technology, not as "a monster to be struck down,"" and urged a
broad interpretation of the subject matter scope of § 101. She
argued that such an interpretation is consistent with a public policy
directed toward the fostering of industrial innovation. 59 She
concurred that Alappat's algorithm invention was patentable
subject matter, whether implemented as hardware in discrete
digital circuitry or in a custom semiconductor chip, or implemented
as software in the permanent read-only memory (ROM) or temporary random-access memory (RAM) of a general-purpose computer.'
' In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

"Id. at 1552.
5
"7

Id. at 1568.
Id. at 1568-71.

58 Id. at 1570.
"In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
60 Id. at 1569-70. Embedded in a digital oscilloscope, Alappat's algorithm would most
likely be implemented either in a circuit of discrete digital logic chips or in a custom chip
such as an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). But the algorithm could easily be
implemented as software loaded temporarily into the RAM of a general purpose computer
or as software loaded more permanently into the ROM of a dedicated computer or controller.
See also Brief for Appellant at 47-48, In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("In today's
technological environment virtually every machine ... uses digital processing, either with
specific digital circuitry and/or a microprocessor executing a program.... If the process is
new, useful and nonobvious, does it really matter whether the implementation is in the form
of analog components, digital components, programs for a computer, or a combination
thereof? Isn't such a differentiation actually exalting form over substance? A programmed
digital computer becomes a special purpose digital computer to perform the function specified
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Judge Newman summarized her arguments in a plea demanding
that the fruits of the Information Age be accorded the monopoly
protections and disclosure obligations of the patent law system,
arguing that the incentives provided by the patent system are
necessary to maximize development of new technologies." 1 She
concluded by noting with approval that the CAFC had undertaken
to "remove the cloud on whether [the inventions of the Information
Age] may participate in the benefits and obligations of the patent
system."6 2
Judge Rader authored a separate concurring opinion to stress his
view that Alappat's algorithm constituted patentable subject
matter, whether claimed in "machine" language or in "process"
language.' He interpreted Supreme Court precedent to permit
inventions to be expressed in a wide range of forms, including
mathematical algorithms and symbols," and decried the PTO's
restrictive application of § 101 to algorithm claims. 5
IV. EXISTING LAW

The Supreme Court first considered application of 35 U.S.C. §
1016 subject matter requirements to the patentability of computer
software in a 1972 case6 7 concerning claims for converting binarycoded numbers into pure binary form.' Because the claims were
for a mathematical "algorithm"69 alone without any physical
by the software.").
" In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
a2 Id. at 1571.
a Id. at 1581 (Rader, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 1582 ("[A] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become
nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program or digital
computer." (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981))).
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Rader, J., concurring).
G "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
67 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
68 Id. at 66-67, 73-74.
oMuch ofthe confusion regarding the patentability of computer software might be traced
to imprecision in the use of the term "algorithm," because "no distinction is made between
mathematical algorithms invented by man, and mathematical algorithms representing
discoveries of scientific principles and laws of nature which reveal a relationship that has
always existed." McKelvey, supra note 12 at 566. See also In re lwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370,
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embodiment, the Court held that the claims were not patentable
under § 101.70 Some commentators viewed the decision as precluding all software from patent protection.71
In 1978, the Supreme Court considered 72 claims directed toward
a computerized monitor of a chemical process which automatically
updated alarm limits for the process.73 Even though the claim
included steps beyond the mere solution of the mathematical
formula (steps to update the alarm limit), the Court followed75
precedent74 and held such "post-solution activity" insufficient
to permit patenting a claim which included an algorithm
that the
76
Court considered to be no more than a scientific truth.
In 1981, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr77 considered
an algorithm which incorporated the well-established Arrhenius
equation into a computerized process for curing rubber. 7' The
Court held that a claim relying on the equation was patentable
subject matter if used in a "useful" process. 79 According to one
interpretation, the Court limited Benson and Flook to the proposi1374, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Ve note these discussions of the meaning
of 'algorithm' to take the mystery out of the term and we point out once again that every
step-by-step process, be it electronic or chemical or mechanical, involves an algorithm in the
broad sense of the term."); In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1396, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 35
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (Rich, J., concurring) (" 'Algorithm' has been used in the sense of a 'procedure
for solving a given type of mathematical problem' and 'formula' is used in the sense of a
mathematical formula. The Supreme Court in Benson appears to have held that claims
drafted in such terms are not patentable-for what reason remaining a mystery."); Jur
Strobos, Stalking the Elusive Patentable Software: Are There Still Diehr or Was It Just a
Flook?, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 363, 377 (1993) ("A computer program is nothing more than
a series of mathematical steps conducted by a machine composed of electronic switches and
storage sites. Such a series of mathematical steps is commonly defined as an algorithm.
Thus, if a sequence of algorithms could not be patentable, the conclusion would have to be
that all computer software is unpatentable." (footnote omitted)).
70 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
"' Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1061, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, J., concurring) (quoting DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 1.01 (1991): "[A] recent Supreme Court Decision seemingly
eliminated patent protection for computer software.").
' Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
73 Id. at 587.
14 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
7' Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
76
Id. at 594.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175.
78
Id. at 177.
7Id.

at 187.
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tion that only narrowly-drawn laws of nature, abstract ideas and
natural phenomena are excluded from patent protection, and that
a mathematical algorithm implemented in computer software was
not necessarily excluded from protection.8° On this view, the
Supreme Court in Diehr addressed both the PTO's and lower
courts' previous exclusion of algorithms from patent protection, in
the absence of any statutory foundation for such exclusion, 8 when
it commanded that "courts should not read into the patent laws
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed."82 Instead, the Court looked to the legislative history and
purpose of the statute to conclude that such unexpressed limitations were improper. 3 Some commentators and lower courts have
suggested that Diehr truly superseded the prior Supreme Court
case law and was not merely an extension of those prior
algorithm
84
cases.

During the development of the Supreme Court's subject matter
jurisprudence, the PTO and the lower courts gradually developed
a two-part test, first enunciated in 1978,' to determine the
patentability of mathematical algorithms." The first step of the
test was a straightforward inquiry into the existence of a mathe-

" Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1065 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (Rader, J., concurring).
"1 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). "The exceptions to patentable subject
matter derive from a lengthy jurisprudence," rather than from statutory authority.
Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1056. See supra note 5 (quoting statute).
" Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1064 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (Rader, J., concurring) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
so Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1057 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1992); cf. Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive PatentableSoftware: Are There Still
Diehr or Was it Just a Flook?, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 363, 364 (1993) ("In retrospect, the
Supreme Court cases say far less about software patentability in general, and more about
the specific claims confronted.... The opinions of the Supreme Court are consistent with
a much broader view of software subject matter patentability than has been implemented
by the Federal Circuit.*); but see Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against
PatentProtectionforAlgorithmsand Other ComputerProgram-RelatedInventions, 39 EMORY
L.J. 1025, 1028-29 (1990) (claiming that Diehr "reaffirmed the Benson ruling on the
unpatentability of algorithms').
o In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
86 This test was predicated on the interpretation that Diamondv. Diehr merely extended
the limitations on algorithm patentability set out in Gottschalk and Flook. See supra note
4.
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If an algorithm was found,

the second step would render an algorithm statutory if it was used
to "define structural relationships between [the claim's] physical
elements." 8 This second step was relaxed in 1982 so that if an
algorithm-incorporating claim, considered without the algorithm,
was statutory, then the claim including the algorithm was also
statutory.8 9
Development of subject-matter doctrine was hindered by
confusion over the meaning of the term "algorithm,"' and patent
applicants learned to avoid naked claims to computer software
regardless of the software's utility.9 The Federal Circuit avoided
the restrictions of the two-step test in 1989,92 when it held that §
112 para. 6 9 3 operated to import external structural elements to
combine with an algorithm, rendering the algorithm itself patentable subject matter.
In 1992, the Federal Circuit considered an appeal9 4 involving a
technique to analyze electrocardiogram signals to detect latent
heart defects. The court held that the analysis algorithm, when
considered as combined with the physical structure of the signal
analyzer, did not operate on merely abstract signals and hence
constituted statutory subject matter. 95 Judge Rader's concurring
opinion' suggested that Diehr required a more direct reliance on
the patent statute and urged the abandonment of the judiciallycreated Freeman-Walter-Abeletwo-step test.97

""In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
o Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1062-64 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
"In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
35 U.S.C § 112 para. 6 (1988) states that claims presented in means-plus-function
terms "shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described
in the specification and equivalents thereof." Id. at 1375.
" Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir.
's

1992).
at 1059-61.
9Id. at 1061-66 (Rader, J., concurring). Note that Judge Rader expressed similar
sentiments in his concurring opinion in Alappat. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
9Id.

97Id.

at 1064-65.
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V. ANALYSIS OF IN RE ALAPPAT

In Alappat, a majority of the en banc CAFC held that an
algorithm easily amenable to computer software implementation
may nonetheless constitute patentable subject matter within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C § 101. This holding firmly establishes that
computer applicationssoftware is patentable and should eliminate
much of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the issue
among the legal and software development communities. The
holding is consonant with the policy considerations underlying the
patent statute, and it reflects congressional intent. While some
argue that patent protection will shackle, rather than promote,
further software development,9 8 the court correctly required that
patent law embrace the Information Age by recognizing that
applications software installed into the memory of a generalpurpose computer creates a virtual machine.
The majority's conclusion is correct for several reasons. First, the
plain meaning of Section 101 states that "any ... process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter" is eligible for protection.9 9
Use of the modifier "any" implies that a broad interpretation is to
be granted."° Judge-made exceptions to the statute, for laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, must be given a
narrow effect in light of the statute's expansive language. 10 '
Further, the legislative history supports an inclusive interpretation
of the statute, as Congress intended that § 101 subject matter
include "anything under the sun that is made by man."0 2
The most powerful argument for an inclusive interpretation of
Garfinkel, supra note 22. Some commentators argue that software development thrives
in an open, sharing environment and that monopoly rights provided by patent law will
actually hinder future software development. See James W. Morando & Christian H. Nadan,
Do Software Patents 'Stac' the Deck Against the Competition?, 11 COMPUTER LAW 1 (April
1994) (noting that software development has grown rapidly over past two decades without
significant patent protection, and warning that many small software developers may be
forced out of business by threat or reality of patent litigation).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
100 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
101 Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1064-65
(Fed.
1 2Cir. 1992).
" Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)).
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§ 101, however, is grounded in policy. Other than to change the
word "art" to "process," the text of § 101 has served to protect the
nation's technical community unchanged since 1793."03 Since
that time our once agrarian society has been transformed by the
technologies of the Industrial Revolution, and the patent law has
The dissent in
evolved to serve corresponding new needs."'
Alappat looked to the long history of the application of the patent
laws and saw as useful only those inventions based on the industrial age technologies of mechanics and materials." 5 The dissent
failed to grasp that modern electronics and computer technology are
1°
not only useful, but will increasingly dominate our economy. 6
As our nation leads the world into the Information Age via the
digital revolution, the law must continue to evolve as well.
The protection of useful innovations is key to our modem
technology-driven economy. Such protection is at the heart of the
economic incentive that underpins free-market theory and provides
motivation to develop the technology from which society benefits.
In the words of Judge Newman's concurrence in Alappat, "[o]ne
must have a powerful reason to exclude technology from the scope
of Title 35. " "° ' To exclude the virtual machine created by loading
applications software into general-purpose computers would be to
deny that such machines are at the heart of much of modem work.
The distinction between statutory applicationssoftware and nonIn re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
104Id. at 1570 (quoting Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945) ("If Congress has

made a choice of language which fairly brings a given situation within a statute, it is
unimportant that the particular application may not have been contemplated by the
legislators.")).
'06 Id. at 1551-57 (Archer, C.J., dissenting).
'06 Green Paper, supra note 1. The National Information Infrastructure (NIl) is the
Clinton Administration's initiative to facilitate the development of a nationwide broadband
two-way communications network, popularly referred to as the information superhighway.
Computer and communications technologies will continue to converge as the information
superhighway is developed; many believe that new information and entertainment services
enabled by these new technologies will propel economic growth forward as we enter the new
millennium. See, e.g., David Mine, Align and Conquer, WIRED 2.07, Feb. 1995, at 110
(describing Bell Atlantic's vision of future broadband networks and services); cf. Carole E.
Handler & Alex W. Farr, The Information Superhighway in 1995: Proceedingwith Caution,
CoMMs. LAW., Winter 1995, at 9 (discussing regulatory impediments to convergence among
telecommunications and cable TV companies necessary to build information superhighway
infrastructure).
0
1 7 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring).
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statutory (but copyrightable) content software is important. The
former includes software elements of word processors, database
managers, spreadsheets, and many other software tools used to
transform information in the modern world. Alappat's rasterizer
algorithm, which can be implemented in software, is but another
tool, transforming a jagged oscilloscope display trace into a
smoother trace. In contrast, content software includes music,
literature, documents, images, video and other information, all of
which may be stored and used in digital form by a computer, but
none of which performs any useful work alone. Indeed, applications software may be applied to perform work on content software,
changing it to create new information or to perform some other
useful function. The dissent argued that Alappat's algorithm, and
by implication all computer software, is analogous to music since
it can be recorded in many forms.1' 8 The dissent thus failed to
appreciate the distinction between applications software, which is
a tool of the modern world, and content software, which is properly
the subject matter of copyright law.
The dissent also argued that mathematical algorithms cannot be
rendered statutory merely by an association with digital hardware
in a patent claim."° However, mathematics includes not only
fundamental rules, but also practical applications based on those
rules."0
Mathematics is another tool in the arsenal of the
inventor, just as chemistry is such a tool."'
Just because
complex digital electronics circuits, and the software which
reconfigures them in the virtual machine, can be represented
wholly by mathematical equations should be no bar to patent11 2
ability.
The majority opinion's choice of precedent in In re Alappat only
tenuously supported" 3 its holding." 4 Instead, the court could

log Id.

at 1553-54 (Archer, C.J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1557 (Archer, C.J., dissenting).
110Id. at 1569 (Newman, J., concurring).
11

1d.

12 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 1545 (citing early cases listed supra note 43).
114

Not surprisingly, the dissent attacks the majority's reliance on the outdated C.C.P.A.

precedent, the most recent of which is a 1978 decision. Id. at 1561-62 (Archer, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Diehr overruled previous C.C.P.A. cases).
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have read Diehr more broadly, explicitly abandoning the two-part
test doctrine of Freeman-Walter-Abele and eliminating the overly
formalistic requirement that an algorithm-based claim must be
statutory when considered excluding the algorithm.115
Since Congress has made no mention of per se exceptions for the
patentability of algorithms, prior decisions concerning algorithms
should be confined to the most narrow definition of that term
consistent with facts of those cases.116 Diehrrequires that subject
matter inquiries focus on the terms of the statute itself, and not on
vague judicially created exceptions to the statute.1 7 A correct
reading of Diehr and 35 U.S.C. § 101 is in harmony with the
economic incentive policy rationale supporting the patentability of
computer applications software and other modern technologies.
The Alappat decision is likely to result in an acceleration in
software patent applications as the software development community"" gains confidence in the stability of PTO and judicial interpretation of subject matter criteria in the software art."9 Attempts to protect software through trade secret law should
diminish, with the corresponding benefits of full disclosure to the
public that the patent law provides. 2 ° Clear and consistently
applied statutory criteria"2 ' should allay fears from smaller
software developers of potentially ruinous software patent litigation

15 Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1064-65
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, J., concurring).
'16 See supra note 69.
11
Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1064 (Fed.

Cir. 1992) ("courts 'should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the
legislature has not expressed.'" (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981))).
lie The software development community is most concerned with novelty and nonobviousness issues, and the PTO's inability to develop and apply a prior art database in the
software area to correctly address those issues. Garfinkel, supra note 22.
11
See, e.g., Stephen D. Kahn and Kenneth R. Parks, Computer Law Cases: The Year in
Review, N.Y. LAW J., Dec. 5, 1994, at 52 (predicting increase in software patent activity after
Alappat); Mitch Betts, Ruling Opens Door to Software Patents, COMPUTER WORLD, Sept. 5,
1994, at 73 (predicting increase in software patent applications).
" Those benefits include not only the spread of knowledge in the software development
community which results from open and full disclosure, but also the improvement in the
prior art database available to the PTO. Garfinkel, supra note 22, at 140.
1 Opening up the patent examination process to permit adversarial comment during
prosecution would also contribute to consistency in software patent determinations. See
Garfinkel, supra note 22, at 142.
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costs. 122 The PTO administration must continue to add staff and
prior art data for the computer software group 123 in order to keep
up with the strong growth24 promised by software development and
software patent activity.
But patent protection typically does not attach until two to three
years after a patent application is initially filed with the PTO, and
trade secret law is unable to protect the value intrinsic to software
in the interim between product release and patent issuance.125
As a result, additional protection for computer software during this
126
interim period is needed to reward and encourage innovation.
As a means to achieve this, commentators have suggested augmenting copyright and patent protection of software via vigorous
assertion of a cause of action in tort for misappropriation 27 in
order to provide reasonable market lead time to innovative software
developers. '

" Leslie Helm, Appeals Court Ruling Opens Door to Further Software Patents, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at 4; Garfinkel, supra note 22.
122Garfinkel, supra note 22.
L Gregory Aharonian, Statisticson Group 2300 - software examiners, Internet posting
to patents@world.std.com, May 2, 1994, at 15:42:29 (projecting tremendous growth in
software patent applications from statistical analysis of software patents issued). See also
Gregory Aharonian, PATNEWS: Software patent statistics for 1994, Internet posting to
patents@world.std.com, Oct. 21, 1994, at 10:16:28 (summarizing software patents issued in
1994 by application and by assignee).
" Manifesto, supra note 7, at n.134. The behavior of applications software (i.e. its
features and functions available to the user) is the primary source of value in software.
Since that behavior is readily apparent to potential competitors and can easily be replicated
without access to the source code, trade secret law is of no avail in protecting the developer's
investment in software creation. Competitors can imitate the software's features and
functions (its behavior), without violating present copyright or trade secret law, well before
any patent will issue. Id.
126 Id. at 2356 ("Most of the commercially significant innovations in software will be
underprotected if patent law adheres to its traditional bounds...").
m Misappropriation is defined as '[t]he unauthorized, improper, or unlawful use of...
property for [a] purpose other than that for which intended." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 998
(6th ed. 1990). Under this theory, substantial replication of program behavior would be
actionable even though no patent has yet been issued. Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2423.
Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2423. The incremental nature of software development
largely precludes patent protection for most new software because the innovation therein
does not rise to the level of "invention" and hence will not meet the novelty and nonobviousness requirements of the patent law. Id. at 2333. Availability of a cause of action in tort for
misappropriation would provide the "lead time" necessary to reward and motivate software
innovators. Manifesto, supra note 7, at 2423.
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VI. CONCLUSION

In holding that computer applications software may be patentable subject matter, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has correctly interpreted the direction provided by the Supreme
Court in Diamond v. Diehr and has abandoned the overly formalistic and unwieldy Freeman-Walter-Abele test for algorithm patentability. The CAFC has now recognized that the technical tools of
the Information Age merit the protections and obligations of the
patent laws-the same laws that helped to develop the tools of the
Industrial Revolution. The decision should lead to more consistent
treatment of software patent applications by both the Patent and
Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit, and the resulting
stability and predictability should contribute to continued progress
within the software development community.
W. WAYT KING, JR.
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